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Abstract
Alliances between national governments and rural elites are observed
in post-colonial Africa. In such alliances, the national governments pre-
serve rural-elite authority formed during the colonial era and cede their
resources and prerogatives to the rural elites. This paper develops a model
of bargaining between a national government and a rural elite, in which the
bargaining power of the national government is endogenously explained
by the ability of the rural elite to compel obedience from rural residents.
Since indirect colonial rule is a signicant source of the rural-elite control
over residents, the result implies that cross-regional variations in colonial
policies lead to variations in the feature of post-colonial alliances between
African national governments and rural elites.
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1 Introduction
In post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, some national governments forge alliances
with rural elites of their national territories (e.g., chiefs and religious leaders).
In such alliances, the national governments preserve rural-elite authority formed
during the colonial era and cede their resources and prerogatives to the rural
elites. A good example is the alliance between the postcolonial Senegalese gov-
ernment and religious leaders in the Su brotherhoods, whose inuence and
control over the population in the Groundnut Basin were reinforced by French
colonial rule. To govern the Groundnut Basin, Leopold Senghor's regime gave
preferential treatment to the religious leaders by providing direct transfers, ced-
ing control over rural public institutions, and recognizing the leaders' control
over land (O'Brien 1975:76-7, 101-9, 126-41; Boone 2003:chap. 3).
Similar alliances are also observed in countries such as Sierra Leone (Migdal
1988:129-34) and Nigeria (Miles 1987), but the degree to which African national
governments provide a privileged status for rural elites varies across and within
countries. Miles (1987) argues that, while Hausa chiefs in Nigeria held privileged
positions in post-colonial regimes, the status of Hausa chiefs in Niger was not
as privileged. Boone (2003, chap. 3) argues that the alliance similar to the one
observed in the Groundnut Basin does not exist in the Lower Casamance region
of Senegal.
This paper develops a game-theoretic model to discuss why and when African
national governments cede their resources and authority to rural elites. In the
model, a national government decides whether to cooperate with a rural elite to
secure revenue. If there is cooperation, the revenue that the two parties collect
is shared according to an agreement. To clarify the bargaining power of the
two parties and the resulting features of the agreement, the model attempts to
explain what each party gains in the case of disagreement.
The argument here departs from the standard presumption that agents in a
society obey government rules (or policies). As Jackson and Rosberg (1982:1)
state, the authority of national governments is weak in the rural societies of
post-colonial Africa. In such societies, national governments and rural elites are
rivals in the competition for resident obedience. That is, both the governments
and rural elites attempt to compel residents to obey their individual rules, and
the residents must choose to obey one of the two authorities (Migdal 1988).
The model considers the situation in which both the national government
and the rural elite attempt to extract revenue from cash crop production. Since
the colonial era, cash crops for export have been the primary products in Africa.1
Thus, as Bates (1981:4, chap. 1) argues, the natural strategy of national gov-
ernments in postcolonial Africa is to collect revenue by extracting the surplus
1Furthermore, governments in developing countries cannot rely on a modern tax system
due to the structure of economies and weak scal capacity (Tanzi and Zee 2000).
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from cash crop production; that is, by purchasing cash crops from farmers at
prices lower than the price in the international market.2 However, rural sectors
in many African countries were subject to the inuence of rural elites since the
colonial era, and it would be also natural for them to seek to purchase farmers'
cash crops for revenue.3
The model denes power as the ability of the national government and rural
elite to impose sanctions on disobedient farmers and analyzes the competition
for farmer obedience and control over the marketing of cash crops. Both the
national government and rural elite simultaneously announce their individual
purchase prices of cash crops, and farmers must choose to whom they will sell
their crops. This situation represents tax competition between the two authori-
ties, but it departs from the standard arguments of tax competition because the
equilibrium revenue depends on the power to impose sanctions on disobedient
farmers.4 The model shows that the relative power of the two authorities de-
termines the revenue of each authority and that government revenue decreases
when the power of the rural elite increases.
To analyze the alliance between the national government and rural elite, the
model is extended to allow for the two authorities to bargain. If they reach
an agreement, they jointly announce a single purchase price and divide the
revenue according to the agreement. Since the revenue obtained by the national
government when negotiations collapse depends negatively on the strength of
the rural elite, the bargaining position of the national government is weak when
facing a powerful rural elite. Thus, the government is likely to agree to a transfer
of large resources to the relatively stronger rural elite during negotiations.
The model implies that variations in colonial policies generate cross-regional
variations in the form of alliances between African national governments and
rural elites. Since indirect colonial rule is a signicant source of rural-elite
power,5 variations in the degree of indirect rule lead to variations in the strength
of the rural-elite control over rural residents. This implication of the model is
consistent with the case of Hausa chiefs. While Hausa chiefs in Nigeria were
empowered under British indirect rule, their power in Niger was restricted under
French direct rule. These dierent governing policies caused dierences in the
2See also Kasara (2007).
3O'Brien (1975:127) states that, during the transition to the independence of Senegal,
\there had been a brief eorescence of privately constituted marketing cooperatives", which
were established by rural elites to purchase crops from their clients.
4Comparing this model with the literature on tax competition, rather than the standard
framework by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), the model structure is
similar to that in Ferrett and Wooton (2010), in which two countries bid in terms of taxes
and subsidies to attract industry.
5Under indirect rule, colonial empires designated rural elites to administer rural areas and
control rural residents. As Migdal (1988:110) argues, this colonial policy increased the rural
elites' power exponentially.
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postcolonial status of Hausa chiefs in Nigeria and Niger (Miles 1987). The model
also shows that agricultural productivity and the costs associated with building
state capacity aect the form of alliance between the national government and
rural elite as well as the government's incentive to increase its power.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this
paper to existing literature. Section 3 provides a brief description of indirect
rule, the formation of rural elites during colonial rule, and the relationship of
the rural elites with post-colonial national governments. Section 4 provides a
model of competition for farmer obedience between the national government
and rural elite. Section 5 extends the model to analyze the bargaining between
the national government and rural elite. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
The most related work to this paper is Boone (2003), who shares the same re-
search question. Although a formal model is not provided, Boone (2003) also
argues that rural-elite control over residents aects their bargaining position
against the national government. However, this paper reaches a dierent con-
clusion. Boone (2003) argues that national governments devolve their authority
to rural elites who cannot extract a surplus from rural sectors without coop-
eration with the governments. By contrast, this paper argues that national
governments devolve their authority to rural elites who are strong rivals in the
competition for revenue extraction.6
Baldwin (2011) also empirically analyzes the devolution between African
national governments and rural elites, arguing that African national leaders
transfer power to win elections. Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) provide a model of
electoral competition, where political parties can commit credibly to providing
transfer for voters using the intermediary of inuential local gures.7 Unlike
these studies, in this paper, the motivation of national governments to give
preferential treatment to rural elites is not electoral competition, but to avoid
competing for the obedience of rural residents. While electoral motives are
important, they do not represent all cases because even military regimes devolve
their authority to rural elites.8
This paper is also related to the literature on the roles of rural authorities
in African societies (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; Kasara 2007; Goldstein and
Udry 2008; Platteau 2009; Glennerster et al. 2010; Logan 2011; Aldashev et al.
2012; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Baldwin 2013; Fergusson 2013; Michalopoulos and
6Furthermore, in this paper, the rural-elite control over residents determines the capacity
of rural elites to extract revenue without cooperation with national governments.
7Robinson and Verdier (2013) also develop a model of clientelism.
8See the case of Nigeria (Miles 1987).
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Papaioannou 2013). Among these works, the model proposed in this paper is
closely related to that of legal dualism (formal vs customary courts) developed
in Aldashev et al. (2012) which analyzes how customary law responds to a
change in statutory law. While this paper resembles Aldashev et al. (2012) in
that formal and rural authorities overlap, they do not analyze how the structure
of rural authority aects the alliances between the two authorities.
This paper also belongs to the literature on legacies of colonialism (Enger-
man and Sokolo 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2001).9 In
particular, Lange (2004) and Iyel (2010) empirically analyze the eects of indi-
rect rule on development. Mizuno and Okazawa (2009) present a model showing
how indirect colonial rule aects post-colonial development in Africa, but their
focus excludes the eects on the alliances between national governments and
rural elites.
Finally, there are inuential studies outside of economics about how strong
rural elites formed by indirect colonial rule play signicant roles in political
development after independence (Migdal 1988; Mamdani 1996). In particular,
the view of this paper is based on Migdal (1988) in that national governments
and rural elites compete for the obedience of rural residents.10 This paper
formalizes Migdal's argument into a game-theoretic model in the context of
taxation in cash crop sectors, which serves as a basis to understand the feature
of alliances between national governments and rural elites.
3 Indirect Colonial Rule and Formation of Ru-
ral Elites
Indirect rule is a form of governance in which colonial empires govern their
colonies' rural regions using the authority of rural indigenous elites and rural
institutions. Autonomous power is granted to the rural elites who lead the rural
institutions (Crowder 1964; O'Brien 1975; Miles 1987; Migdal 1988; Mamdani
1996; Boone 2003; Lange 2009). Since the rural institutions are quite dier-
ent from the institutions at the center of a colony, indirect rule draws a sharp
contrast between the center and the periphery: the former is ruled by \bureau-
9See also, among others, the empirical studies by Bertocchi and Canova (2002), Lange
(2004), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Huillery (2009), Iyel (2010), and Lee and Schultz (2012),
and the theoretical studies by Congdon Fors and Olsson (2007), Nunn (2007), and Mizuno
and Okazawa (2009).
10Migdal (1988:25) contends that government agencies operate alongside various social or-
ganizations and that these \organizations-all the clans, clubs, and communities-have used a
variety of sanctions, rewards, and symbols to induce people to behave in their interactions
according to certain rules or norms". Migdal (1988:24-33) further argues that residents must
choose between obeying the government or these social organizations as both attempt to
impose their own rules.
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cratic legalism" and the latter is ruled by \customary patrimonialism" (Lange
2009:28).
Indirect rule enhanced the rural-elite power. Examining British colonial rule
in Sierra Leone, Migdal (1988:110) argues that the British largely restructured
indigenous authorities and signicantly increased the chiefs' power: \the lo-
cal leaders' power grew immensely through the British formalization of chiefs'
duties and privileges and through the resources the British lent to that pro-
cess". Granted authority to extract revenue from their subjects, the rural elites
abused this authority for their own interests. Acemoglu et al. (2013:10-1) ar-
gue that land laws put in force by colonial rule in Sierra Leone vested chiefs
with authority over land that enabled them to tax agricultural production and
trade. Lange (2004:907) argues that chiefs could shape customary law to serve
their own interests and that \Customary law also endowed chiefs with control
over communal lands and chiefdom police, both of which could be coercively
employed to dominate local inhabitants."
Colonial empires in Africa generally adopted indirect rule (Mamdani 1996:72-
90), but forms and intensity of indirect rule varied across regions. Crowder
(1964) argues that the power of chiefs under French colonial rule was restricted
and less autonomous compared to that under British rule. This argument is
consistent with the case of Hausa chiefs in Nigeria and Niger presented by Miles
(1987). However, the French delegated extensive and autonomous authority
to the religious leaders in the Su brotherhoods in Senegal (O'Brien 1975:101-
9; Boone 2003:54-60). The degree of indirect rule also varied across British
colonies. Based on data from former British colonies, Lange (2004) constructs
an objective measure of the degree of indirect rule that is dened as the per-
centage of customary court cases to total court cases in 1955. According to this
measure, the degree of indirect rule varies across British African colonies: while
the degree of indirect rule is high in Malawi (81.8), Nigeria (93.4), Sierra Leone
(80.8), and Uganda (79.6), it is low in Botswana (42.5), Gambia (37.3), and
Zimbabwe (39.7).
In post-colonial Africa, national governments often backed rural-elite au-
thority. Acemoglu et al. (2013:10) note that the land laws, on which the chiefs'
control over land is based, remain in force in Sierra Leone. Migdal (1988:132)
writes that,
With social control of the population largely vested in the chiefs' or-
ganizations, Margai [the rst prime minister of Sierra Leone] \bought"
social stability and security of his own tenure by refusing to attack
the prerogatives of the chiefs....the array of rewards and sanctions
in the hands of the chiefs to maintain their social control remained
very impressive.
Herbst (2000:174-6) argues that African national government leaders had \am-
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bivalence toward traditional leaders": although some distrusted the chiefs, the
national governments had to accommodate them to control the rural areas.
Herbst (2000:176-7) further notes that,
As a result, postindependence African states were often schizophrenic
in their approach to chiefs....in Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, states
abolished or marginalized chiefs after independence only to invite
them back a few years later in the face of extraordinary diculties
in governing the rural areas.
As previously mentioned, similar alliances between national governments and
rural elites can be also found in Nigeria and Senegal.
4 Baseline Model
As a result of colonial rule, rural residents in former African colonies faced two
distinct authorities after independence: rural elites, who were obeyed by the
rural residents during the colonial era, and post-colonial national governments.
The model introduced in this section describes how a powerful rural elite impede
a national government from collecting revenue.
4.1 Environment
Consider a dynamic game of complete information with three players: a national
government, a rural elite, and rural residents (treated as a single entity here).
The residents choose whether to engage in cash crop production. Those who
choose cash crop production can grow y units of cash crops. The income level
of those who do not choose cash crop production is normalized to zero.
Cash crop producers sell their crops to either the national government or
the rural elite. The national government and the rural elite announce their
respective purchase prices denoted by p and ~p, respectively. The international
price of the cash crop is normalized to one. Thus, both the national government
and rural elite have no incentive to purchase the crops at prices higher than
one. Hence, the national government obtains (1  p)y if the producers sell their
crops to the national government. Similarly, the rural elite obtain (1   ~p)y if
the producers sell their crops to the rural elite. The model assumes that the
farmers cannot directly access the international market for the cash crops. The
authority that cannot purchase the crops obtains no revenue.
Cash crop producers who sell their crops to the national government face
sanctions by the rural elite and lose ~by, where ~b 2 [0; 1]. Exogenous parameter
~b represents the strength of the rural elite, who can impose high sanctions on
the residents when their power is great. Sanctions by the rural elite include, for
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example, a ban on the use of communal land and sentences based on customary
law. Because indirect colonial rule largely enhanced the power of rural elites, ~b
can be interpreted as the degree of indirect rule.
Similarly, the national government sanctions the producers who sell their
crops to the rural elite. To gather information on rural producers who violate
ocial orders, the national government needs to locate its agencies in rural re-
gions. As the government expands its local agencies, it can detect oenders
with a higher probability. Sanctions by the national government are, for ex-
ample, the withdrawal of government assistance such as farm subsidies. As the
government assistance becomes more eective, a ban on the access to such as-
sistance will have increasingly severe repercussions for farmers. To implement
such eective agricultural assistance, the national government needs to increase
its bureaucratic capacity. Let q denote the probability that the national govern-
ment detects a farmer who sells the crops to the rural elite and let By denote
the level of sanctions imposed on the oender. The farmers' expected loss from
government sanctions is, therefore, by  qBy. The variable b, which is assumed
in [0; 1], represents the national government's capacity to control its rural res-
idents, hereinafter called \coercive capacity". The level of coercive capacity
is endogenously determined by national government investment.11 The cost of
building coercive capacity is given by cb2=2, where c > 0 is a cost parameter.
As Herbst (2000) argues, a low population density will lead to a high cost of
building state capacity.12
Preferences of all agents in the model are linear. The payo to the national
government is revenue minus the cost of investment in coercive capacity. The
payo to the rural elite is revenue. The payo to the residents who choose cash
crop production is (p  ~b)y, if they sell their crops to the national government,
and (~p b)y, if they sell their crops to the rural elite. The payo to the residents
is zero if they do not choose cash crop production.
The timeline of events within the model is as follows:
1. The national government invests in coercive capacity b.
2. The national government and rural elite simultaneously announce the pur-
chase prices of cash crops.
3. The residents choose whether to engage in cash crop production. If they
choose cash crop production, they also choose who will buy their cash
crops.
11Besley and Persson (2009, 2010) provide models in which the government invests in scal
and legal state capacity. Acemoglu (2005) analyzes the consequence of weak and strong state
capacity.
12Low population density will lead to a large cost of monitoring resident behavior.
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4. The national government and rural elite impose individual sanctions on
disobedient producers.
4.2 Equilibrium
4.2.1 Residents' Choice
The game is solved by backwards induction. Given the purchase prices and
sanctions, the residents choose whether to engage in cash crop production. If
the residents choose cash crop production, they also choose who will buy their
cash crops. If they sell to the national government, the residents receive py and
lose ~by through sanctions by the rural elite. Conversely, whoever sells to the
rural elite receives ~py and loses by through sanctions by the national government.
Accordingly, those who produce the cash crops sell to the national government
only if
(p  ~b)y  (~p  b)y: (1)
The residents choose to grow the cash crops if and only if
maxf(p  ~b)y; (~p  b)yg  0: (2)
In this model, both the national government and rural elite sanction a res-
ident if and only if the resident violates their respective orders. Since either
party can impose sanctions without incurring any costs, this action is weakly
optimal. Even if sanctioning entails costs, reputation eects will compel them
to sanction the residents who disobey. Consider that some residents cannot
observe the cost of the imposed sanctions. In this case, the authorities might
sanction a resident to convince others that their cost of sanctioning is low. By
doing so, the authorities can compel obedience.
4.2.2 Competition between the National Government and Rural
Elite
Anticipating the residents' choices, the national government and the rural elite
announce their purchase prices simultaneously. From (1), the national govern-
ment can purchase the farmers' cash crops only if p  ~p  (b ~b). Similarly, the
rural elite can purchase the crops only if ~p  p  (~b  b). The price competition
that the national government and rural elite engage in is similar to that in the
Bertrand model.
The equilibrium purchase prices depend on b and ~b. If b  ~b, the national
government announces p = 1   (b   ~b) and the rural elite announce ~p = 1. If
~b > b, the national government announces p = 1 and the rural elite announce
~p = 1   (~b   b). In equilibrium, the residents' payo is identical, regardless
of whether the residents obey the national government or the rural elite, but
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the residents must obey the authority who announces the lower purchase price.
Otherwise, the authority with the lower price has an incentive to raise the price.
In equilibrium, the authority with a stronger power to impose sanctions can
purchase the farmers' crops, but the purchase price is increasing in the other
authority's power. Since the equilibrium purchase prices satisfy p  ~b and ~p  b,
the residents choose to produce the cash crops in equilibrium.
4.2.3 Optimal National Government Investment
The national government invests in coercive capacity b. If b  ~b, the national
government cannot obtain a positive revenue and the investment in coercive
capacity generates nothing. Thus, if b is positive, it must be larger than ~b.
When the optimal coercive capacity b is positive, it solves the problem
max
b2[0;1]
(b  ~b)y   c
2
b2 s.t. b > ~b: (3)
Ignoring the constraint b > ~b, the solution of this problem is b = y=c; the
national government obtains y2=2c   ~by.13 This payo is positive if and only
if ~b < y=2c. In this case, b = y=c satises the constraint b > ~b. The optimal
coercive capacity is positive if and only if the national government receives a
positive payo from its investment.14 Therefore, the optimal coercive capacity
b is given by
b =
(
y
c if
~b < y2c ;
0 if ~b  y2c :
(4)
Hence, if ~b  y=2c, the national government cannot purchase the cash crops
from the farmers. In equilibrium, the national government announces
p =
8<:1 

y
c   ~b

if ~b < y2c ;
1 if ~b  y2c :
(5)
The equilibrium national government revenue as a share of GDP is
1  p =
(
y
c   ~b if ~b < y2c ;
0 if ~b  y2c ;
(6)
which is nonincreasing in ~b. The rural elite revenue as a share of GDP is
1  ~p =
(
0 if ~b < y2c ;
~b if ~b  y2c ;
(7)
which is nondecreasing in ~b.
13The model assumes that y=c  1, so that the constraint b  1 does not bind.
14Note that the national government can obtain zero payo by setting b = 0.
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Proposition 1. The national government cannot compel the farmers to obey
when the strength of the rural elite (the degree of indirect rule) ~b is large. The
share of national government revenue in GDP is low in the following situations:
 Production level y is low.
 The cost of the national government building coercive capacity c is high.
 The strength of the rural elite (the degree of indirect rule) ~b is high.
5 Agreement between the National Government
and Rural Elite
As argued in Section 3, the national government and rural elite might strike
an interdependent relationship: the former relies on the latter to control the
rural areas and, in return, guarantees a degree of authority and revenue. This
section extends the baseline model to allow for negotiation between the national
government and rural elite. If they reach an agreement, they jointly announce a
purchase price. In this case, the national government can control the marketing
of cash crops exclusively in cooperation with the rural elite.
In fact, public monopsony prevails in the domestic cash crop markets of
post-colonial Africa. Bates (1981:12) notes that,
In Africa, public agencies are by law sanctioned to serve as sole
buyers of major agricultural exports. These agencies, bequeathed to
the governments of the independent states by their colonial predeces-
sors, purchase cash crops for export at administratively determined
domestic prices, and then sell them at the prevailing world market
prices. By using their market power to keep the price paid to the
farmer below the price set by the world market, they accumulate
funds from the agricultural sector.
In Senegal, the national government devolves the control of the government's
marketing institutions to the rural elite and, thereby, transfers resources ex-
tracted from the rural sectors to the rural elite (O'Brien 1975:126-41; Boone
2003:70-2).
Since the income of residents who do not grow the cash crops is zero in
the model, the national government and rural elite can set the purchase price
at zero, if they cooperate. During negotiations, they bargain the allocation of
revenues. If the negotiations collapse, they announce individual purchase prices
and the events indicated in the baseline model occur. The bargaining outcome is
determined by the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950). The timing of events
is as follows:
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1. The national government invests in coercive capacity b.
2. The national government and the rural elite bargain.
3. Upon reaching an agreement, they jointly set the purchase price at zero
and divide the resulting revenue y as per the agreement. If negotiations
collapse, events 2, 3, and 4 in the baseline model follow.
5.1 Equilibrium
5.1.1 Bargaining Outcomes
If the national government and rural elite reach an agreement, they monopolize
the purchase of cash crops and collect revenue equal to y. The national gov-
ernment and rural elite bargain to divide this revenue. The agreement point is
denoted by (y   x; x), where y   x is the national government's revenue and x
is the rural elite's revenue.
Consider the case of b  ~b. If the parties involved cannot agree, the national
government and the rural elite obtain (b   ~b)y and 0, respectively, from the
results of the baseline model. Thus, the Nash bargaining solution x solves
max
x
[y   x  (b  ~b)y]x: (8)
The solution is x = (1   b + ~b)y=2, and the national government receives
(1 + b  ~b)y=2. When an agreement is reached, the total wealth extracted from
the residents increases by y   (b   ~b)y. In the Nash solution, the authorities
equally divide this surplus. The power of the two authorities aects the bar-
gaining outcome through the payo they receive when they do not reach an
agreement. The revenue obtained by the national government after negotia-
tions fail is decreasing in the strength of rural elite ~b and is increasing in its
coercive capacity b. Accordingly, a large ~b and a small b lead to a weak bar-
gaining position of the national government and result in a small share in the
agreement.
Next, consider the case of b < ~b. If no agreement is reached, the national
government and the rural elite obtain 0 and (~b   b)y, respectively. Thus, the
Nash bargaining solution x solves
max
x
[y   x][x  (~b  b)y]: (9)
The solution is x = (1 + ~b   b)y=2, and the national government receives
(1 + b  ~b)y=2. As the rural elite's revenue in the revenue competition (~b  b)y
increases, the national government's share of the agreement decreases.
Summarizing the results, the national government's revenue in both cases is
(1 + b  ~b)y=2, which is increasing in b and decreasing in ~b.
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5.1.2 Optimal National Government Investment
The optimal coercive capacity b solves
max
b2[0;1]
1 + b  ~b
2
y   c
2
b2; (10)
and is equal to y=2c. When the national government and rural elite negotiate,
the national government invests in coercive capacity to aect the bargaining
outcome. The optimal coercive capacity is independent of the strength of the
rural elite ~b.
The equilibrium national government revenue as a share of GDP is
1 +
y
2c
  ~b
 1
2
; (11)
which is decreasing in ~b. The equilibrium rural elite revenue as a share of GDP
is 
1  y
2c
+~b
 1
2
; (12)
which is increasing in ~b.
When the rural elite has a strong capacity to sanction disobedient residents,
it is dicult for the national government to compel obedience and gain revenue.
Due to this weak position, the national government agrees to transfer large
resources to the rural elite.
Proposition 2. When the national government and the rural elite bargain, the
following results hold:
 The coercive capacity b is y=2c.
 The national government revenue as a share of GDP is increasing in y
and decreasing in c and ~b.
 The rural elite's revenue as a share of GDP is decreasing in y and increas-
ing in c and ~b.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of competition between a national government
and a rural elite for revenue gained from cash crop production. The model
shows that each party's revenue is nonincreasing in the other party's power
to impose sanctions on rural residents and nondecreasing in its own power.
Extending this baseline model to allow for bargaining between the two parties,
this paper provides an explanation on when the national government cedes large
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resources to the rural elite. When the national government faces a rural elite
with strong capacity to compel resident obedience, it agrees to transfer a large
amount of resources to the rural elite because its bargaining position is weak.
Furthermore, when there is high agricultural productivity and a low cost of
building coercive capacity, the national government will invest in more coercive
capacity, strengthen its bargaining position, and decrease the rural-elite share
in the agreement.
As many previous studies argue, indirect colonial rule is a signicant source
of rural-elite power. Thus, the result of the model implies that national govern-
ments will cede many resources and prerogatives to rural elites in regions where
colonial powers intensively implemented indirect rule.15
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